A thief wants something valuable and wants to leave quickly. The people interested in a defence site or supplier may be very different: patient, well resourced and content to spend months watching, recruiting an insider or slipping a contractor onto site before attempting anything. They may want information rather than equipment, or simply to show that they could get in.
Beyond the main gate
Military establishments often have strong outer perimeters. The weaknesses tend to sit elsewhere: in the supply chain companies that design and build equipment, in offices away from the main site, in the contractors who maintain facilities, and in the habits of people who have grown used to working inside a secure environment.
What testing looks at
How visible the site and its people are to hostile reconnaissance, including online. Whether pass and visitor controls hold up against confident social engineering. How contractors and deliveries are managed. Whether sensitive areas are as segregated in practice as they are on paper. How quickly an intrusion would be detected and challenged.
Working within your rules
Testing is scoped closely with the organisation’s security controllers, with clear boundaries around restricted areas and agreed procedures if testers are stopped.
Protecting the people too
Staff at defence organisations can be targeted away from work. Our counter-surveillance training and threat awareness sessions help them recognise approaches. Discuss a requirement.
